Spain: November 1525, 21-30 | British History Online

Pages 483-505

Calendar of State Papers, Spain, Volume 3 Part 1, 1525-1526. Originally published by Her Majesty's Stationery Office, London, 1873.

Citation:

November 1525, 21-30



22 Nov.	275. Louis de Praet, Imperial Ambassador in France, to the Emperor.
K. u. K. Haus- Hof- u. Staats Arch. Wien. Rep. P. C. Fasc. 224, f.	Since his last letter by a gentleman of the Prince of Orange nothing important has occurred, except that the President of Paris (Jean Selve) and the Bishop of Embrun (François de Tournon) have lately returned to Toledo. Has no hope whatever of the French King consenting to the cession of Burgundy. They (the French) persist in using nothing but the same sort of general language. One thing, however, is certain, that M. de Guise is gone to the Swiss, to persuade them to invade the duchy of Milan, in pursuance of a treaty said to have been entered into with the knowledge and by the advice of the Pope and the Venetians.
	The fuorusciti of that Duchy, most of whom reside in this city (Lyons), are expected to make some stir, now that the Marquis of Pescara is lying ill. He (Praet) sees certain signs which, seem to indicate that something is about to be undertaken against the Low Countries. All the captains on that frontier, with the exception of M. de Vendome, set off the other day. St. Pol and Vaudemont leave in two days for Picardy. Has written to Madame, informing her of this fact, that she may be on the alert. Expects an answer from her in two or three days by Guillaume des Barres. Will not fail to inform the Emperor of what may occur in the meantime, as likewise of the arrival of Commander Herrera whom he expects to-morrow, though he (Praet) hears that he has been detained by illness at Montpellier.
	The English ambassadors are expected here to-morrow, the 23d. One of them is the Captain of Guisnes; the other a doctor in Wolsey's service. (fn. n1) They come with a train of about 60 horse, and their principal charge is said to be to receive the Regent's oath and the ratification of the peace lately concluded between France and England—Lyons, 22 of Nov. 1525.
	Signed: "Loys de Praet."
22 Nov.	276. The Marquis of Pescara to Francesco Sforza [Duke of Milan].
M. Re. Ac. d. Hist. Salazar, A. 36, f. 215.	If the most Illustrious Francesco Sforza cared as much for the service and interests of His Imperial Majesty as he does to appear by many a protest and offer in the light of a faithful servant, there would be no necessity for the Illustrious Marquis of Pescara, Commander-in-Chief of the Imperial armies in Italy, to spend his time in writing or verbally disputing with the aforesaid Sforza, a sort of occupation more suitable to litigants than to people of their rank and condition.
	The grievances whereof Signor Francesco complains he has brought on himself by refusing to grant the securities demanded. But whereas the said Signor Francesco, in his last protest, dated the 13th inst., strives to throw all the blame of this affair on the Marquis, making him responsible for future consequences, his Lordship—always anxious to promote the Imperial service, and at the same time to offer such vindication of his own acts as may be deemed compatible with his honour and reputation—takes this opportunity of answering the said protest by adhering entirely to the proposals and answers heretofore made on either side, declaring the said proposals and answers as made and inserted in every deed and public act that has been or may be drawn up hereafter respecting this matter, for the Marquis does not intend to be either part or judge in the present suit, but merely the executor of the Imperial orders, as befits the Commander-in-Chief of his army, without, however, deviating from justice, but, on the contrary, following it strictly.
	Respecting the affair itself, it is the Marquis' intention to proceed as behoves a captain-general, and one upon whom the important duty of preserving the Imperial army and securing the estate of Milan devolves, which duties can only be fulfilled by military measures and precautions, not by judicial proceedings. But in so doing, the Marquis never thought of inflicting on the said Signor Francesco more injury or damage than what his own acts—so different from his words and promises—and the coercive measures necessary to be adopted by the Emperor's generals are likely to bring on him. For if reduced to such an extremity, the Marquis will rather seek to ward off the injuries, dangers and damages threatening His Imperial Majesty than to retaliate and inflict the same treatment upon others.
	Signor Francesco ought not to exaggerate his own merits and services to the Emperor, when certainly they are nothing but a just return of the many favours conferred on him by the Emperor; such as making him Duke of Milan, through his own graciousness and benevolence, not in any way compelled by circumstances; maintaining him in his Estate, and helping him with his armies and generals, his friends and his money, against all those who wanted to do him injury; often hazarding for his sake a good portion of his own dominions and hereditary kingdoms; which benefits and graces on the part of the Emperor no services however signal or great, such as those alleged by Signor Francesco, could in any way counterbalance. It would have been more to his credit had he modestly refrained from making any allusion at all to the said services, since it is evident that whatever he did in favour of the Imperial cause was equally calculated to promote his own interests and maintain himself in his Estate. God alone knows, had things gone otherwise, or had the Emperor's fortunes and interests been at stake, whether Signor Francesco would have shown such alacrity and devotion to the Imperial service.
	However this may be, no induction can be drawn from the services thus alleged by Signor Francesco whereupon to establish his own innocence of the charges now brought against him. Time and new interests may have brought on a change of ideas. His Lordship may have co-operated in the defence of the estate of Milan, as far as he himself was concerned, but may since have formed designs and entered into plans calculated to promote his own personal aggrandisement, such as liberating his Estate from the ties of vassalage, securing it against the French, and ultimately expelling the ultramontanes from Italy, which seems to be one of his favourite projects, and also the principal charge brought against him.
	Such being the case—as may be clearly proved and demonstrated—all presumption of innocence must be put aside, Signor Francesco being fully aware that the Marquis is well acquainted with his doings and practices, as well as his secret negotiations, from beginning to end; and that what he knows is either from his own mouth or in virtue of declarations made by his authority and consent. In matters, therefore, so clearly demonstrated as the present one is, it is not for the Marquis to waver in his determination and wait for further proofs, especially when he sees Signor Francesco as obstinate as ever in refusing to grant the securities demanded for the Imperial army under his command being neither molested nor attacked.
	Were Signor Francesco's professed innocence to be satisfactorily established, he may be sure that His Imperial Majesty will not take away that which was so graciously bestowed upon him, and that no dishonour or injury will fall upon him. The Marquis knows full well the dangers of procrastination; otherwise he would have had no difficulty in granting the prorogation applied for, which, as long as the principal fortresses of the Estate remained in our hands might have been indefinitely prolonged. Indeed, had the Marquis acceded to Signor Francesco's request, the Imperial army and the many interests attached to it would have been entirely at the mercy of Signor Francesco, who, from the fact of his ruling in Milan,, and having close at hand and beyond the Alps friends on whom he could rely, and with whom he was in secret negotiation, might have thus become the arbiter of its fortunes. The Marquis, moreover, would have incurred the Emperor's censure by acting contrary to his instructions and to the express orders received [from Court], since being acquainted, as he is, with Signor Francesco's secret dealings and aspirations, though the latter is not yet convicted of them, he would, by trusting to him, have endangered the Imperial cause.
	As Signor Francesco, therefore, still persists in his refusal to grant the required securities, which, after all, are by no means so important or considerable as might be required under the present circumstances, he has no reason whatever to complain if the Marquis does not leave the welfare of the army and the interests of the Empire at his mercy. By refusing to comply with the Emperor's just demands and by making an armed resistance, Signor Francesco renders himself more and more open to suspicion from the Marquis, who, having regard to his Ducal dignity, never intended, at first, to attack him in his castle of Milan, but only to keep him closely besieged and surrounded, so that he might not at any time, and on the war breaking out, do injury to the Imperial armies. Such, however, was his audacity that, without the least provocation on the part of the Imperial troops, he caused the artillery of the castle to fire upon them, and ordered other hostile acts, through which many soldiers have been killed or wounded; thus failing in his obedience to His Imperial Majesty and to his ministers and delegates in Italy.
	But as, notwithstanding his ingratitude and rebellion, Signor Francesco still complains of certain wrongs and acts of violence which he wantonly imputes to the Marquis, it behoves him to declare that the measures complained of have been taken with reluctance in strict obedience to the Emperor's orders, and with a view to save the Imperial army from disaster, promising again that if Signor Francesco will give the securities demanded, no injury shall be done to the castle or to those inside, provided, however, all hostilities cease on their part.
	And whereas the said Signor Francesco has, by his obstinacy, rebellion and frequent hostilities, shown himself to be adverse to the Emperor's interests, notwithstanding all his professions of fidelity and affection, the said Marquis, in virtue of his office and as Commander-in-Chief of the Imperial armies in Italy, summons him, under pain of being deprived of his fief and tried for rebellion, to abstain himself, and make his people in the castles of Milan and Cremona abstain, from any hostilities against the Imperial troops, who will then in like manner cease from the same; to furnish immediately the securities demanded, and give positive orders for all the governors and wardens in the Estate to come and take at the Imperial quarters the unconditional oath of allegiance to the Emperor, according to, and in the form of, the last warrants issued for that purpose. Signor Francesco is, moreover, summoned to deliver into the hands of the said Marquis the persons of Giovanni Angelo Riccio (fn. n2) and Policiano, that the truth may be investigated and the guilty parties discovered, since Signor Francesco pretending, as he does, to be innocent of the charges brought against him, he can only prove his allegation by means of the said witnesses. In short, he is summoned to comply immediately with all demands contained in the said mandate and warrant, under pain of deprivation of his Estate and any other penalties that his disobedience and rebellion may bring upon him.
	As to his request that a safe-conduct may be furnished to the man he intends to send to the Emperor, the Marquis can only repeat what he has said on previous occasions; he praises Signor Francesco's determination, and shall be happy to give the safe-conduct when required.—Milan, 22 Nov. 1525.
	Addressed: "To Signor Francesco Sforza."
	Indorsed: "The Marquis of Pescara's answer to Francesco Sforza, 22 Nov. 1525."
	Italian. Contemporary copy. pp. 6.
22 Nov.	277. Becharia Brothers to the Emperor.
M. Re. Ac d. Hist, Salazar, A. 36, f. 226.	Giovani Georgio and Matheo Becharia, citizens of Pavia, humbly represent to the Emperor their long services to the Imperial cause, and the total ruin of their fortune during the Italian wars in Maximilian's time, as His Majesty has no doubt been informed by the late Cardinal Sedunensis and others. Owing to which services His Imperial Majesty, in the year 1521, and whilst at the Diet of Worms, had the kindness to promise Matheo some compensation for their losses. Since then both brothers have served with equal devotion, both at Pavia and elsewhere, as the Illustrious Viceroy of Naples (Charles de Lannoy) and Fernando de Alarcon cannot fail to testify.
	The above promise of reward having remained without effect, the undersigned have again applied through the Marquis of Pescara and Antonio de Leyva—to both of whom their merits and devotion are known—for a compensation of the losses by them sustained in the Imperial service. Begging, &c.—Pavia, 22 Nov. 1525.
	Signed: "Fidelissimi Servitores Johannes Georgius et Mattheus Fratres de Becharia, papienses."
	Addressed: "Sacratissimæ et Invictissimæ Sacræ Cæsaris et Catholicæ Majestati."
	Indorsed: "To His Majesty. From the brothers Becharia, decimo Kal. Decembris 1525."
	Latin. Original. p. 1.
23 Nov.	278. Lope de Soria, Imperial Ambassador in Genoa, to the Emperor.
M. Re. Ac. d. Hist. Salazar, A. 36, f. 220.	Encloses duplicate of his despatch of the 17th, which Domingo de Aguirre, the Duke of Sessa's messenger, took. Has since had letters from Milan, of the 18th, stating that the Marquis of Pescara was better; that the castle was being more closely invested, and that the garrison fired continually on the besiegers. The Marquis had changed all the public officers at Milan, and appointed new magistrates to administer justice in the Emperor's name, but had not yet changed the Senators, who alleged that they could not meet and transact business for any other but the Duke (Francesco Sforza) unless he had been first deprived of his Ducal dignity. All the revenue was being collected in the Emperor's name, and Hieronymo de Vercelli had been appointed chief magistrate (capitan de justizia) of the city.
	(Cipher:) His Majesty's good servants in Italy wish to call his attention to two things, firstly, the necessity of appointing a general to take the command-in-chief of the Imperial army, because the Marquis' illness, though not mortal, is of such gravity as often to prevent him from attending to business and being present at the engagements which may take place any day; secondly, the facts that money is wanted more than ever, and that under the present circumstances it certainly is not advisable to leave an army without proper provision.
	(Common writing:) Nothing new to advise from Genoa. The Doge and Community persevere in their devotion to the Imperial cause, and are very anxious for the return of their galleys [from Spain], as the time for the expiration of the truce is fast approaching. The harbour of Savona has been completed blocked up; they are now destroying the wharfs. Several attempts have been made to stop the Genoese in their work of destruction, but to no purpose.
	(Cipher:) Letters from Lyons, of the 16th inst., have been received, stating that the French had so little hope of peace being made that they thought of nothing else but collecting money for the ensuing war, and that M. de Brion was to leave soon for Spain, to bring back Madame d'Alençon to France.
	(Common writing:) The warder (alcayde) of Gaeta was to have left Milan post-haste on the 20th inst., on his way to Spain. By him His Imperial Majesty will be fully informed of the state of affairs in Naples, Rome and Milan.—Genoa, 23 Nov. 1525.
	Signed: "Lope de Soria."
	Post data.—After writing the above, intelligence has been received in this city that the galleys of Andrea Doria were at Noli, three leagues from Savona; their destination is unknown. Doria may, perhaps, be in connivance with the Fregosi, some of whom have lately joined the Papal galleys and those of the Order of St. John.
	Addressed: "To the Sacred, Imperial and Catholic Majesty."
	Indorsed: "To the King. 1525, From Genoa. Lope de Soria, 23 Nov."
	Spanish. Original, pp. 2⅓.
23 Nov.	279. The Duke of Sessa, Imperial Ambassador in Rome, to the Emperor.
M. Re. Ac. d. Hist. Salazar, A. 36, f. 228.	(Cipher:) Wrote on the 13th, 16th and 18th inst. what had occurred up to that date; but so brisk have been the practices of the confederates ever since, that he (Sessa) has determined to send the present letter by all possible routes, sea as well as land.
	His Imperial Majesty may be assured that the negotiations are as active as ever, and these people on the eve of throwing off the mask, being much excited by the late occurrences at Milan, as well as by the news they receive [from that Court] almost daily. Had he (Sessa) not stayed the Pope with the hope that His Imperial Majesty was shortly to send his last decision with regard to pending matters, the whole thing would have exploded, and the plans of the confederates been made known. But the Pope is losing his confidence in him, saying that he (Sessa) is only lulling him with vain hopes and giving time for the Imperialists to get possession of the estate of Milan. Has often heard the Pope say that, in his opinion, this next messenger will not bring any answer respecting this particular case [of Milan], but only with regard to his own claims about Modena and Rezo (Reggio), which he considers, as far as he himself is concerned, the less important part of the negotiation. He had always looked upon the Emperor as on a favoured son of the Church, wishing him all prosperity and good fortune, so that he might become in time—everyone willing and helping—the sole arbiter and master in Italy. This, however (he added), was not to be accomplished by sheer force, and against the will of the Italian powers, but by their own express consent and with their co-operation. He cannot, therefore, bear the idea of His Imperial Majesty keeping the duchy of Milan for himself, or giving it away to the Archduke (Infante Don Fernando), for such, he maintains, has always been the Emperor's aim and object, and that the delay in granting the investiture of the Duchy to Francesco Sforza had no other origin. The Morono affair (he says) was got up for no other purpose than to have the Duke of Milan condemned, and make all other Italian potentates participators in his guilt. Which last design (he added) was made patent from the circumstance of the Imperial generals and ministers in Italy having tried all means in their power to produce discontent and drive the said Prince3 to extremity, which aim (he said) they had attained at last, since he (the Pope), the Venetians, and the rest of Italy were in constant fear and mistrust of the Emperor's movements.
	Such is the substance of the conference which His Holiness held with him (Sessa) a few days ago. There can be no doubt that he is at the present moment greatly solicited by the Venetians, who, considering themselves already bound by treaty with France, urge him to declare himself. The Pope, as far as he (Sessa) can make out, hesitates to resolve upon any decided measure, for whilst disliking war and its expenses, he is nevertheless continually urged on by the confederates, (fn. n3) and yet knows how much may be lost by irresolution, which seems to be part of his nature. Is very much afraid that, in the end, the Pope will yield to the solicitations of the Venetians, and openly declare against the Emperor, unless something is done in the meantime to appease him and calm his fears. With all this, it must be said that the Pope professes that he would rather accept one favour from the Emperor than a hundred from the rest (fn. n4) of the Princes by whom his alliance is solicited.
	If he (Sessa) be rightly informed, the plans of the confederates consist in obtaining from France 500 lances and 6,000 infantry, besides taking into their pay a large number of Switzers. With these forces, added to those of Venice and other powers, they expect united Italy to rise at the cry of Liberty, and expel the ultramontanes. Whilst the Imperial army concentrates in the Estate, so as to defend Pavia, Lodi Alessandria, Trezzo and other fortresses, the enemy's forces, are to invade the kingdom of Naples by sea and land, where the defences are so few, and the fidelity of the people so wavering—if we are to judge by the past—that they imagine its conquest achievable.
	This last being their principal object, he (Sessa) has written to the Marquis of Pescara, recommending that a body of 1,500 Germans and 500 Spaniards be sent thither. With these forces serving as a nucleus for fresh levies, a small army might be formed, wherewith to resist the attacks of the enemy, who, finding the enterprise more difficult than they at first imagined, would perhaps desist from their plans.
	Humbly beseeches the Emperor to come to a determination in this affair, for the confederates so dread his aggrandisement and increase of power in Italy that no consideration will stop them in their career; besides which, they openly declare that His Imperial Majesty has no allies now to come to his assistance and no money with which to support his armies, whilst they boast of possessing the two elements of war, i.e., plenty of resources and numerous friends.
	Of the late events at Milan and Naples, His Imperial Majesty is no doubt fully informed, and therefore there is no need for him (Sessa) to say more about it. His reports are limited to what he hears and sees at Rome. Has reason, however, to fear that no credit is given to his remarks, and that this despatch will remain unanswered, as others have been. Will, nevertheless, persevere in what he considers to be his duty, namely, to state his opinion and tender his advice upon matters so important to the Imperial service and reputation. Begs again to remind the Emperor of his wish to retire from public life, for, certainly, to oblige him to reside at Rome as his ambassador and representative, without either authority or credit, is a very dangerous experiment for His Imperial Majesty to try under the present circumstances, notwithstanding that he (Sessa) may serve his office with loyalty and honour, the only two qualities at his disposal.—Rome, 23 Nov. 1525. "El Duque de Sessa."
	Feels sure that His Majesty has already been informed of the Marquis of Pescara's precarious state of health, whose illness, though not yet declared mortal, gives still much cause for anxiety, as, in case of war, it will prevent his attending to any military business at all. It behoves His Imperial Majesty well to consider the possibility of such an event, and provide for a successor to the Marquis in case of need.
	The English ambassadors solicit the Pope to enter into this league, being, as it would appear, closely united to France and to the Venetians. These last have formed the design of calling the Turk to their aid, as he (Sessa) has advised in former despatches.
	The Pope is now in a worse predicament than ever he was. People utter the most terrible threats and blasphemies, openly accusing him of having, by his indecision and parsimony, brought Italy to the point at which it is. The Pope knows this well, and dissembles; but it is to be feared that, having so many people round him who are hostile to the Imperial cause, he may, one of these days, be induced to join the confederates, especially if no further provision be made at Court about his own personal matters and claims.
	Post data.—This letter goes under cover to Secretary Soria by a messenger of the Marquis of Pescara. Nothing new except that the plot thickens, and that the confederates make use of the late events at Milan to excite the passions of the people against His Imperial Majesty and his supposed designs of universal monarchy. So ripe are things getting that it becomes imperative to provide for an emergency.—Rome, 25 Nov.
	Addressed: "To the most Sacred, Imperial and Catholic Majesty."
	Indorsed: "To the King. 1525. From Rome. The Duke of Sessa, 23d of November."
	Spanish. Original mostly in cipher. Contemporary deciphering. pp. 4.
25 Nov.	280. The Abbot of Najera to the Emperor.
M. Re. Ac. d. Hist. Salazar, A. 36, f. 242.	His letter of the 17th instant was to announce how, on the 13th, the Duke of Milan had shut himself up in his castle, and how, notwithstanding that, the inhabitants of this city and Estate continued faithful and devoted to the Imperial service. The present despatch, by express, has two principal objects; namely, to ask for speedy remittances for the maintenance and support of this Imperial army, and the appointment of a general to command it in case of the Marquis of Pescara being disabled by disease.
	He (the Abbot) has frequently alluded in his despatches to the total want of resources. The revenues of the Estate are mortgaged for this year and the greater part of the next, and the merchants and bankers of this place refuse to advance more money until they know for certain in whose hands the Duchy is to remain. There is nothing left to pawn or pledge, and the army is so exasperated that a mutiny is daily apprehended. Yesterday (the 24th) one month's pay, amounting to 19,000 ducats, became due to the Germans; 4,000 have been paid to-day on account, but whence the remaining 15,000 are to come, nobody can guess. By dint of promises and caresses, and by inviting the captains to his table, Antonio de Leyva has hitherto succeeded in calming down the tumultuous clamours of these soldiers, whom nothing can satisfy short of their full pay, provisions being now so scarce and dear at Milan that they can with difficulty be procured even for ready money.
	His Imperial Majesty is humbly requested by all his faithful servants in these parts to apply prompt redress to the sufferings of this army, and to issue orders for the Marquis of Pescara and the other generals to be written to oftener than they are, and informed of what passes at Court, that they may contradict the various rumours in circulation, all more or less unfavourable to the Imperial interests, and which are, no doubt, artfully spread by the enemy in order to keep up the present agitation. Among other news said to have been received from Spain is that of the negotiations for peace being broken off, and of there being no chance now of a settlement between the Emperor and the King of France. Owing to which rumour and others adroitly circulated in Italy, the plots of the Pope and Venetians with France and England are thicker than ever. The Bishop of Bayeux is now at Venice, with full powers to treat from the Regent of France, as the Imperial ambassadors in that Republic, Prothonotary Caracciolo and Alonso Sanchez, cannot fail to have announced ere this. The Venetians, moreover, are gradually increasing their army. Their ambassador in this Estate (Marco Antonio Venier) left, four days ago, for Bergamo, thence to proceed to Venice; the Marquis of Pescara having appointed two gentlemen of his suite to accompany him as far as the frontiers of this Duchy, and Leyva given him several horses and beasts of burden to carry his luggage.
	There is a report that the Pope has sent to the Marquis of Mantua for 300 light horse, wherewith to garrison the city of Parma. They are at present at their quarters in Romania, and their commander, Count Guido Rangone, has lately been distributing money among certain captains and friends of his at Modena, to make levies in those parts. He (the Abbot) cannot say whether these military preparations of the Pope and the Venetians are only intended, as they state publicly, to guard their own frontiers, or to come to the assistance of this Duke.
	The Swiss envoys who were at Rome have for the most part left that city very well satisfied, as they say, with the Pope's reception. The envoy of Surico (Zurich) only has remained behind, but he will shortly leave also as much pleased with his visit as the rest of his colleagues.
	The Grisons took, some time ago, the castle of Chiavenna, its garrison having surrendered for want of firewood, wine and even water. This happened on the 21st instant. Soon after the Grisons demolished the castle, and marched away. No more has been heard of them since.
	There is one thing above all others to which the Marquis of Pescara and the rest of the generals and functionaries in this place humbly beseech His Imperial Majesty to attend, namely, this business of the peace with France. The Emperor must, as soon as possible, either come to an agreement with the French King—after taking proper securities and hostages from him—or else make alliance with the Pope and the Venetians, after granting some of their demands, so as not to give them time to plot and arm themselves.
	The Duke of Ferrara has returned home very much disgusted at his not being allowed to pass through France into Spain to kiss the Imperial hands.
	The Marquis del Guasto and Antonio de Leyva are doing their best to surround this castle of Milan on all sides. It is already almost completely invested, notwithstanding the artillery fire of the garrison. On the 13th instant the Duke sent a sort of protest to the Marquis of Pescara, to which a suitable answer was returned on the 22d. The day after, the Duke sent back the Marquis' letter, pretending it could not be meant for him, as he was not named therein. The fact is that the Marquis, following the opinion of lawyers consulted upon this particular, did not address him as Duke of Milan, but merely as Signor Francesco Sforza, which circumstance, joined to the many disagreeable truths contained in the Marquis' paper, was, no doubt, the real cause of the Duke's refusing to reply. Copies of both papers—the Duke's protest and the Marquis' answer—are here enclosed, (fn. n5) whereby His Imperial Majesty will learn what has been done since. After the departure of the courier, on the 17th, the governor of Gaeta arrived. He is to leave for Spain in a few days, and will bear despatches up to the present hour.
	Hieronymo Moron is drawing up his own plea, which, when completed, will be forwarded to Court, that justice may be done and the Duke punished as he deserves. It is for His Imperial Majesty to decide how and in whose name this Duchy is to be administered, because for the present and until a declaratory sentence be issued for or against this Duke, his Estate can only be governed by the Marquis as Captain-General of the Emperor and Governor of the Estate of Milan.
	The second and perhaps also the principal reason for this despatch, conveyed as it is by special messenger, is the precarious state of the Marquis' health, for he is so weak and prostrated by disease that no reasonable hope of his recovery can be entertained. Should God bring his' life to an end, it would be necessary at once to appoint to the command of this army some person of military reputation, who might keep this army together and baffle the plans of the enemy until the arrival of the Viceroy of Naples (Charles de Lannoy), or the Emperor's expected visit to Italy. Either Antonio de Leyva, whose experience and military qualities are well known, or the Marquis del Guasto, who, though young, is much beloved by the army, or any other of the captains and faithful servants of the Emperor now residing in Italy might easily take charge of it, provided there was money for its maintenance.—Milan, 25 Nov. 1525.
	Signed: "El Abad de Najera."
	Addressed: "To His most Sacred, Imperial and Catholic Majesty."
	Indorsed: "To the King. 1525. From Milan. The Abbot of Najera, 25 Nov."
	Spanish. Holograph. pp. 3¼.
26 Nov.	281. Louise of Savoy to the Chancellor of Alençon and M. de Vaux, French Ambassadors in England.
Arch. Nat. Paris. J. 965.	Notwithstanding the pains taken since the conclusion of the treaties made in England to obtain from the Courts of Parliament of this kingdom, from the Princes as well as from the towns and Estates of Normandy and Languedoc, the requisite ratifications and engagements, as stipulated in the said treaties, several are still wanting, owing to the great distance of some places and to other causes. Will not rest until everything is done. The ambassadors are to request the Cardinal of York to get the term prolonged until the 15th of January, or at any rate till the 1st. As a proof of her good intentions, encloses the amount engaged for by the Princes of the Realm, by the towns of Toulouse, Lyons and Amiens, and what the estates of Languedoc have hitherto done in this particular. The money for this month's payment is ready. Should any difficulty be made about the prolongation of the term, which she (the Regent) cannot believe, considering her readiness to pay, it will proceed from ill-will, and show that the English are looking out for a cause for rupture, in which case she leaves it to the prudence and high discretion of her ambassadors to see that the money already paid be not lost.
	Has despatched Charpaignes to Toulouse and Bourdeaux to publish the treaties there, and have them properly registered in the Courts of Parliament, as those of Paris and Rouen have already done. When ready, will send them to the ambassadors to give to the King, and obtain his in return.
	Has news from Spain that the King, her son, has recovered his appetite and strength, and is now quite out of danger. The Bishop d'Ambrun (Embrun) and the First President (Selve) have been recalled to renew the overtures which had been made for the King's delivery. Meanwhile his sister, the Duchess of Alençon, remains with him to console and comfort him, as she has done hitherto.
	Has news from Italy, stating that the Emperor's affairs did not prosper at all in that quarter, owing to which he was doing all he could to gain over to his side the Pope and the Venetians, who, however, remain firm in their purpose of joining the present Italian league against him. As to herself, following in this respect the advice of the King of England and of the Cardinal of York, she has sent her full powers to adhere to it. All Italy has the greatest confidence in the King of England and in the Cardinal of York, knowing well how much they desire the liberty and preservation of that country. Wishes the King would send powers to his ambassador at Rome, and write as often as possible to the Pope and to the Signory. The Emperor is doubtless aiming not only at being crowned but at becoming the supreme monarch of Christendom. The ambassadors are to inform the Cardinal of the Emperor's marriage to the sister of the King of Portugal (Infanta Isabel), chiefly to obtain with her a sufficient sum of money for his journey to Rome.
	The English ambassadors arrived this afternoon. Has caused them to be received as coming from her son's best friend.—St. Just sur Lyons, 26 Nov. 1525.
	Signed: "Loyse."
	Countersigned: "Noblet."
27 Nov.	282. Prothonotary Caracciolo and Alonso Sanchez, Imperial Ambassadors in Venice, to the Emperor.
M. Re. Ac. d. Hist. Salazar, A. 36, f. 244.	Since their letter of the 20th inst. nothing new has occurred. They are anxiously waiting for instructions, since for want of them and from the apparent unwillingness of the deputies to treat, the negotiations are entirely suspended.
	(Cipher:) The proposals made to this Signory by the French ambassadors are reduced to this: France offers to furnish 500 lances, besides 40,000 crowns every month for the pay of 10,000 Switzers. The King of England is to contribute monthly 25,000 cr.; and it is reported that letters have come from France and from England confirming the said offers. To ensure the payment of his monthly contribution for the expenses of the war, the King of England offers to deposit here [at Venice] 100,000 crowns. The Imperial ambassadors have reason to think that the Venetians have not yet accepted the above proposals. They are no doubt waiting for the issue of the affairs now pending between His Imperial Majesty and the King of France. Their intentions, however, are far from being good, and if they find help in their plans, they are sure to do mischief. They are known to be making all manner of preparations to defend, as they say, their frontiers, but they keep their doings so secret that it is almost impossible to obtain any intelligence about them.
	Latterly, in consequence of letters received from their ambassador at the Imperial court, (fn. n6) announcing that the Emperor had made an agreement with the Pope, the Signory has suddenly become mistrustful of His Holiness, to whom they no longer despatch messengers, as they used to do, every three days. Since the 16th, which was the date of their last courier, no letters have been sent to Rome or have come from that city. It would be a blessing if these suspicions of the Venetians increased, and the Pope really took the Emperor's side.
	Respecting the Duke of Ferrara's return there is nothing to say, since it must be known at Court through the Marquis of Pescara.—Venice, 27 Nov. 1525.
	Signed: "El Protonotario Caracciolo," "Alonso Sanchez."
	Addressed: "To the Sacred, Imperial and Catholic Majesty of the Emperor and King, our Lord."
	Indorsed: "To the King. 1525. From Venice. From the Imperial Ambassadors, Prothonotary Caracciolo and Alonso Sanchez."
	Spanish. Original mostly in cipher. Contemporary deciphering on separate sheet. pp. 2½.
28 Nov.	283. Louise of Savoy to her Ambassadors (fn. n7) in England.
Arch. Imp. Paris, J. 965.	Has since her last (of the 26th Nov.) held communications with the English ambassadors, and granted their demands, having agreed before the ecclesiastical judge to the engagements for the money, according to treaty, and having afterwards taken the oath at the Church of St. John of Lyons with all solemnity. As the said ambassadors are despatching a courier home with this intelligence, she (the Regent) loses no time in informing them of that circumstance, that they may announce the same to the King and Cardinal.
	The ambassadors are to ask the King [of England] to prolong the term for the ratifications not yet obtained to the 15th Feb., if possible, or at least till the 15th Jan. The English ambassadors are also writing home about this, for difficulties have been raised about the said ratification, especially by the inhabitants of Paris, not, indeed, by respectable citizens or high personages, but by tradesmen and low people, all for want of understanding what is asked of them.
	Hears from Spain that the King (Francis) makes good progress, and is getting every day stronger, as well as more firm in his resolution not to give up a foot of land, though he offers an honourable ransom, according the advice given him by the Cardinal of York.—Saint Just, over Lyon, 28 Nov. 1525.
	Signed: "Loyse."
	Countersigned: "Noblet."
	Addressed: "A Monsieur le Chancellier [d'Alençon] and Monsieur de Vaulx, Ambassadeurs en Angleterre."
	French. Original. p. 1½.
29 Nov.	284. Prothonotary Caracciolo and Alonso Sanchez, Imperial Ambassadors in Venice, to the Emperor.
M. Re. Ac. d. Hist. Salazar, A. 36, ff. 250–3.	After their joint letter of the 27th inst. a courier arrived from Rome with the following intelligence:—
	(Cipher:) The Duke of Sessa writes, in date of the 23d, that the practices of the confederates have lately become more active and eager than ever. In his opinion the only thing that could prevent an explosion was the hope the Pope had of the proposed agreement being favourable to him. His Holiness, however, showed no disposition to consent to His Imperial Majesty s becoming sole master of the duchy of Milan.
	What the Imperial ambassadors have heard respecting the said particulars is this, that on the 23d the Signory had letters from their ambassador (fn. n8) at Rome, informing them that although the Pope had declared on the 17th that he could not persuade the Florentines to join the league—which declaration, added to the fact of the Emperor having lately entered into an agreement with His Holiness, had naturally aroused the suspicions of the Signory—he had suddenly changed his mind, and prevailed upon the said Florentines to make common cause with him and the rest of the confederates.
	The decision of the Pope has calmed the fears of these people, who are more disposed than ever to do all the harm they can to the Imperial cause. The plans of the confederates seem to be as follows: France to furnish 500 lances and 40,000 cr. every month. The King of England 25,000 cr., paid monthly. The Pope and Florentines some little money, the amount of which is not stated. The French, it is said, ask as a condition that the Duke Maximiano (Maximiliano Sforza) be put in possession of the estate of Milan, and this Republic bound to maintain him in it. Another condition is for Venice to furnish a certain contingent of troops wherewith to invade the kingdom of Naples. This last, however, the Republic does not feel inclined to grant, believing that the French ask too much in order to get what they want. The ambassadors cannot answer for the truth of these reports, though the intelligence comes from a person well versed in government affairs and who is in the habit of giving them true and valuable information.
	On the 28th of October last, the ambassadors of France had a secret audience, which lasted one hour and a half, the subject of which is yet unknown, though it may be confidently asserted that it was not to the Emperor's profit or advantage.
	This Republic is putting her arsenal in order, so as to be ready to arm her fleet on the return of fine weather. The coasts of Apulia and Sicily ought, therefore, to be placed in a state of defence, not so much on account of these people as on account of the Turk, perhaps, however, of both. The best remedy, however, would be a letter from His Imperial Majesty, announcing the settlement of the present difficulties, or else provision to carry on the war, if necessary.—Venice, 29 Nov. 1525.
	Signed: "El Protonotario Caracciolo," "Alonso Sanchez."
	Addressed: "To the Sacred, Imperial and Catholic Majesty of the Emperor and King, our Lord."
	Indorsed: "To the King. 1525. From Venice. Alonso Sanchez, 29 Nov."
	Spanish. Original mostly in cipher. Contemporary deciphering. pp. 4.
30 Nov.	285. The Duke of Sessa, Imperial Ambassador in Rome, to the Emperor.
M. Re. Ac. d. Hist. Salazar, A. 36, f. 257.	Recommends a petition of Clemente Albané's, postmaster of this city (Rome), whose son wishes to be naturalized in Spain. His father has served the Empire for upwards of 40 years, and well deserves this favour.
	Prothonotary De Gambara (fn. n9) is likewise a devoted servant of the Emperor. He and the Count, his brother, have served faithfully on every occasion. He (Sessa) warmly commends them both to the Imperial notice for posts in the army or elsewhere, as they are anxious to show their devotion.—Rome, 30th of Nov. 1525.
	Signed: "El Duque de Sesa."
	Addressed: "To the most Sacred and Invincible Emperor, King of Spain and of the two Sicilies, our Lord and Master."
	Indorsed: "To the King. 1525. From Rome. The Duke of Sessa, 30th of Nov. Answered."
	Spanish. Original. p. 1.
30 Nov.	286. The Same to the Same.
M. Re. Ac. d. Hist. Salazar, A. 36, ff. 261–5.	Has done all he could to acquaint the Emperor with the state of affairs up to the 25th inst. Since then, perceiving that the intrigues of the confederated powers grew warmer every day, and that, instead of their plans being secretly conducted, as before, they were publicly discussed, he (Sessa) determined to call upon the Pope, to inform him of what he had heard, and complain, in the strongest terms he could, of the projected league against the Emperor.
	This the Pope admitted at once, adding that he could not help listening to the proposals of the Italian and other Princes. He had been waiting in vain for His Imperial Majesty's decision about his own private affairs, and although the Chancellor (Gattinara) had lately written to say that a gentleman (fn. n10) of the Emperor's bedchamber would shortly bring his final resolution, the messenger had not yet made his appearance. Meanwhile the Imperial generals and ministers in Italy were seizing estates and lands without consideration of or respect to anyone. He did not choose to be at their mercy, but would protect himself as best he could. God was witness of his natural aversion from war; but rather than submit to an indignity, he would advise that course, as the surest means of obtaining universal peace. Nobody knew better than he did the dangers and inconveniences of such a step, but he much preferred running any risk to being dependent upon another man's will. The Emperor's last acts were not in harmony with his professions at other times. He had always declared it to be his intention to promote the welfare of Italy, to maintain every Prince on his own estate, and defend them against any attacks whatsoever, and yet he had begun by seizing and appropriating to himself one of the finest estates in Italy, and there was reason to believe that he would, in the end, take possession of all the rest.
	Many other things did the Pope say to the same purpose, which he (Sessa) need not repeat. After making a suitable answer to each of his objections, he concluded by begging the Pope not to take part with the confederates until he heard the Emperor's decision, as he had no doubt that by writing to Spain and explaining his position and views, everything would be settled to his satisfaction. He (Sessa) meant thereby to gain time, but the Pope would not consent to it, saying that he (Sessa) might, if he chose, write home and report his conversation, but that he could not promise to wait for any period of time however short, because were he to take such an engagement, the chances were that at the expiration of the term fixed he would be placed in a most awkward position, the Emperor being able to follow whichever course of politics suited him best, whilst he (the Pope) would be bound, as it were, by the stipulations of the league which he had promised to join without having had time to discuss his own terms first.
	Sends this messenger to inform His Imperial Majesty of the Pope's present sentiments and feelings. As far as he can gather from his conversation and from what other influential people tell him, the Pope's wishes and aspirations are that His Imperial Majesty fulfil his promise of maintaining each Italian Prince in his own estate. That if the Duke of Milan be guilty of the charges brought against him, so as to deserve being deprived of his estate, the Emperor name some one else to fill his place, so as to remove all cause of fear and apprehension of his greatness and increasing power. In fact, so far has this last idea gained possession of Italian minds, that they openly declare the late Milan affair to have been got up on purpose, with the Emperor's consent and approval, merely to find a plea for the Duke's supposed guilt and consequent deprivation of his estate, he (Morono) having dexterously dragged the Duke into the conspiracy.
	As to his own overtures to the Marquis of Pescara, the Pope pretends not only to have a just plea for what he did, but to be able to prove, if necessary, that, far from being the instigator and promoter of that idea, he accepted it from others. (fn. n11)
	Being asked whether he felt disposed to enter into a separate league with the Emperor, he declared that he could not, since, were he to do so, all other Princes would thereby be compelled to accept the terms offered by His Imperial Majesty. He might, perhaps, persuade each of the confederates to abandon some of their pretensions, as his only wish was—and had always been—to maintain them in their possessions, and save them from utter ruin. If a plan could be hit upon to quiet the world at large and remove all cause of anxiety and danger, he (the Pope) would be the first to forward it with all his might, since he wished to be the Emperor's kind father and friend.
	From the above declaration it is evident that His Holiness' mind is in a state of suspense; and that, notwithstanding the pressing demands of the French and Venetians—in which England also joins—he is still wavering and uncertain. The following are said to be the plans of the confederates: France proposes to contribute with 1,000 men-at-arms and 40,000 ducats every month, besides their usual sea forces. They renounce also their rights to the estate of Milan in favour of the present Duke, and make other considerable offers. Alberto del Carpio (Carpi) has ample powers from the kingdom and Regent [of France] to conclude the league. There seem to have been several difficulties at first, as he (Sessa) has been informed. It was objected that the money offered by England was not near at hand; that the articles proposed by France were not much to the Venetians' taste; and that the Republic itself had no great confidence in the Pope, believing that—the money once paid and the expense met—he might forsake the league and make his peace with the Emperor. But it is asserted that all these difficulties have now disappeared, and that everything is settled between them.
	He (Sessa) has reason to believe that the Venetians have their eye on Carmona (Cremona) and la Geradada (Ghiara d'Adda), though they keep their designs as secret as possible. On the whole, the plots of the confederates are more active than ever; and the general belief is that the league is altogether concluded, though the Pope has often declared, upon oath, that he has not yet taken any engagement with them.
	One of the things to which these people seem to have made up their mind is the invasion of the kingdom of Naples, which, from its almost defenceless state and from the little confidence to be placed in its inhabitants—who are generally considered inclined to this Italian league against the Emperor—offers the confederates no small chance of success.
	He (Sessa) would not insist upon this and other matters were it not that the intentions of the league are avowedly to do all possible harm to the Emperor, and oblige him to abandon Italy altogether. They openly declare their wish to be that the Emperor come to some agreement with the King of France and set him at liberty, whatever may be the securities and pledges demanded; and they would consider themselves highly favoured if, by means of the aforesaid league, they ensured the success of their plans.
	Should war be decided upon, it is imperative for His Imperial Majesty to provide means for his army, and look to the defence of that kingdom (Naples), which, as before stated, is threatened with invasion.
	The gentleman (Miguel de Herrera) who is to bring us the Emperor's resolution on this material point not being yet arrived, it is very difficult for him (Sessa) to know what to say or how to act. He will do all he can to persuade the Pope to wait, but is not sure of success, for those who surround His Holiness are for the most part enemies to the Empire, and the Archbishop of Capua (Schomberg) has not so much authority or influence as could be desired.
	Has been told that a servant of the Duke of Milan, called Juan Antonio Petra, (fn. n12) had been arrested at Venice; according to his own confession, this servant had been sent thither by the Marquis of Pescara for the purpose of inducing the Milanese ambassador in that city to declare what he knew of the Duke's plans and intrigues, so that his testimony should coincide with that of Morono. The ambassador had him arrested, and he has since divulged the whole thing, to weaken, as it is believed, the charges brought against his master.—Rome, 29 Nov. 1525.
	Post data.—Since the above was written, he (Sessa) has had the following intelligence from a most reliable source. It appears that the plans of the confederates have been lately modified in this manner: The Pope to furnish 800 lances and 10,000 infantry of any nation that he pleases. The Venetians an equal number, besides certain light cavalry and artillery in proportion. France, 500 lances and 40,000 ducats monthly, for the pay of 10,000 Switzers. With these forces, amounting altogether to 30,000 infantry and upwards of 2,000 men-at-arms, besides light cavalry and artillery, they expect to free Italy from the Imperial yoke, by defeating our armies, or at least shutting them up within the duchy of Milan. That being done, they propose invading the kingdom of Naples, which, as has been above said, appears to them a very easy enterprise. The principal difficulty—which has for some time delayed the conclusion of the league—lies in the sea forces to be furnished by the Venetians, as the French wish the fleet to be composed of 30 galleys, including their own and those of the Pope, which would give the Venetians a much larger share in the expense and equipment than they actually choose to have.
	Another of the French requirements was, that after Italy had been liberated from the Imperial rule, the Italian Princes should be obliged to assist them with their respective contingents of troops, so as to invade Flanders and Spain at once, and oblige the Emperor to set his prisoner at liberty. This last difficulty has, it would appear, lately been disposed of, the Italian Princes having agreed to assist France with one half of their respective armies, which is exactly the number promised by them. The sea forces have likewise been altered as to their respective proportions, so that the confederates are only waiting now for the Pope to give in his adhesion; but he, as before stated, still wavers in his determination.
	To guard against the probable event of the King of France making peace with the Emperor in the meantime, and placing them, as it were, in jeopardy, it has been stipulated that he (the King) give at once sufficient guarantee in merchants' bills for the payment of four monthly instalments, at the rate of 40,000 ducats each. The King of England contributes, besides, a large sum of money, which the rest of the confederates engage to repay him hereafter.
	Such is the actual state of things. The Pope has not yet taken any final engagement, and wishes to come to an agreement with His Imperial Majesty, but the confederates so urge him to decide in their favour that unless a speedy settlement of the whole question come from Spain, it is to be feared that he will ultimately yield to their pressing solicitations. In the meantime, he (Sessa) will do his utmost to prevent this, although ignorant of the Imperial wishes and intentions on this point, and not knowing whether he is to give the Pope hopes or take them away entirely, he is quite in the dark, and knows not which system to adopt as the best. He will, however, follow that which appears to him most advantageous under the present circumstances, namely, to maintain the Pope in his irresolution and waverings.
	It must not, however, be believed at home that by the Emperor making peace with the King of France and restoring him to his liberty, all these Italian troubles and dissensions will be ended. On the contrary, he (Sessa) is of opinion that the very moment that is done, the war will again be kindled with greater fury than ever in Italy; for no sooner will the French King recover his freedom than the Italians will send for him, gain his affections, and make him master of the duchy of Milan. Such are the plans of the confederates, who make no mystery of them.
	The last letters received from Milan, in date of the 23d inst., represent the Marquis of Pescara's health as very low. He was daily losing strength, and his life was almost despaired of. It behoves His Imperial Majesty to decide who is to take command of the Imperial army, in the not improbable case of God's calling him hence speedily.
	The Pope has lately shown some discontent at the news that a detachment of the Imperial army had been quartered upon the lands of the Church. That, however, is of very little consequence in comparison with his other subjects of complaint.—30th Nov.
	The garrison of this castle of Milan make frequent sallies to skirmish with the besieging forces, rather, as is generally believed, to give and receive information of what is going on than for any hostile purpose, since the said sallies and skirmishes have no result whatever. The inhabitants of the city and the country people generally are discontented, for violence is at all times odious, and the great injuries inflicted by the soldiery in their respective quarters, besides other extortions, tend to alienate the people's affections from them.
	The Duke of Ferrara has come back. What the real cause of his return may be God only knows.
	Signed: "El Duque de Sessa."
	Addressed: "To the most Sacred, Imperial and Catholic Majesty of the Emperor and King, our Lord and Master."
	Indorsed: "To the King. 1525. From Rome. The Duke of Sessa, 30 Nov."
	Spanish. Original entirely written in cipher. Contemporary deciphering on separate sheet pp. 5.
30 Nov.	287. Commander Herrera to the Emperor.
M. Re. Ac. d. Hist. Salazar, A. 36, f. 269.	Yesterday, on St. Andrew's eve, he (Herrera) arrived at Milan, where he found the Marquis of Pescara so reduced by illness that he had scarcely power even to listen to the verbal message whereof he was bearer. His Imperial Majesty should immediately appoint some person of repute to succeed him, for, on the death of the Marquis, this army must not be left without a commander.
	Many other things could he (Herrera) say to this purpose, but having no secretary by him to write in cipher, he will postpone his report until he reaches Rome. Has met Lope Hurtado [at Milan], and conferred with him on matters important to the Imperial service, as he will, no doubt, advise by his ciphered despatch. Begs that full credence be given to him on whatever he reports.
	The Marquis and Antonio de Leyva having heard that he (Herrera) was the bearer of certain powers from His Imperial Majesty, wherein the generals of this army are alluded to, applied for a copy, that they might act accordingly. But as his commission was not to leave the said powers in their hands, he (Herrera) resolved to intrust them to Lope Hurtado, who will keep them secret and closed until written to from Borne. Indeed, were his negotiations at that place to fail entirely, and the Pope to refuse coming to an agreement with His Imperial Majesty, it would be necessary for the generals of the army to take cognizance of the said powers, in which case the transmission of the parcel would be very difficult, if not impossible, from Rome. All this considered he (Herrera) has intrusted them to Hurtado's keeping. — Milan, 30 Nov. 1525.
	Signed: "Herrera."
	Addressed: "To the Sacred, Imperial, Catholic Majesty of the Emperor and King, &c."
	Indorsed: "To the King. 1525. From Milan. Commander Herrera, 30 Nov."
	Spanish. Holograph. pp. 3.