5 Feb.
H. H. u. St. A.
England, f. 1.
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The Ambassadors in England to Charles V.
Since the departure of Aymercourt, the maître d'hôtel of my
lord, your brother, we have received important letters from
Rome, and the arrival of M. de Beaurain at a port in this kingdom
offers us a safe means of sending you the latest news.
Two days ago I, De Mesa, received three briefs from the pope,
one addressed to the king of England, one to the cardinal-legate,
and the third to me, in which His Holiness asked me to present
the other two letters to the king and the cardinal and to exhort
them to agree to a three year truce with the French, adding
many arguments which your majesty can see in the copies sent
herewith. I am also sending a copy of a letter which His Holiness
wrote me in cipher describing the intrigues of the Venetians with
the French and the Swiss, seeking to revive the Italian enterprise.
I presented these briefs to the cardinal, who promised to talk to
Henry and inform us of his opinion. We shall advise you by the
first courier. From Wolsey's first reaction, however, we gather
that he would prefer such an armistice as he had proposed.
Three years seems to him too long, both because it will afford the
enemy time to recruit their forces, and on account of the Scottish
war, which he has much at heart.
Wolsey said he heard that, because of the rigorous demands
on them made through Geronimo Adorno, the Venetians despaired
of coming to terms with you, and were arranging a new and
closer alliance with the French and have about agreed to furnish
for the reconquest of Italy, eight thousand foot, six hundred
men-at-arms, and payment for half of twenty thousand Swiss,
the French to place in their hands the town of Cremona, which
they expect their joint forces shortly to recapture. Wolsey
recurred to his opinion that, in view of the state of affairs in
Italy, your majesty had been too harsh with the Venetians at
the outset.
At this time Wolsey began again to rehearse the whole matter
of the indemnity and ended a long discourse by saying that if
your majesty did not furnish things here henceforward better
than you had so far, and according to your agreement with the
king, his master, you would lose all your credit here, for so far
you had accomplished nothing of what had been agreed, and you
ought at least to pay the indemnity to the king, and the pensions
due Suffolk and the other lords here. It was better, he said, to
promise nothing than not to keep a promise. He then went back
over his own affairs, complaining that in spite of the great
services he had done your majesty, he had not yet been paid the
arrears of his pension on the bishopric of Palencia, nor had any
security for the pension of 2,500 ducats which you had promised
to assign him in Spain, in return for acquitting me, De Mesa, of
the charge on the bishopric of Badajoz.
We replied as best we could in the same terms as we wrote you
in your last letter. This whole affair seems to us very difficult,
for the indemnity due the king and the pensions to Wolsey,
Suffolk and others, amount to a very great sum ; on the other
hand, if you pay nothing, there is no doubt it will be taken very
badly here, since these people have a natural inclination for
money, and their friendship will be much cooled. To make
matters worse, your majesty will have to pay both the two sums
due the king and the other pensions, for Wolsey has told us
expressly that neither he nor any other Englishman will accept
a penny until Henry is paid. We beg your majesty for instructions
on this point, and feel obliged to add that if the English are
not satisfied in some fashion we fear the consequences may be
very grave.
Henry has spoken contemptuously of the Spanish failure to
defend the Galician coast. According to what Henry says, there
is a small number of French ships lying off Cape Finisterre and
the ports thereabouts, and doing a great deal of mischief, without
meeting any resistance. Henry expressed great surprise at this,
and a very low opinion of the Spaniards who would let themselves
be pillaged by so small a force. We did our best to remove this
impression, but he said he had accurate news, particularly of two
English ships with valuable cargoes which had been taken by
the French in this quarter. For this reason, and also because he
heard a number of French ships were going from Boulogne,
Dieppe and other Norman harbours to Gascony to load wine, he
has sent six of his warships westward to intercept and fight the
French if possible. We are sending, enclosed herewith, a copy of
M. de Gavres' letter, giving a detailed account of the defeat of
the French and the Spanish mutineers. Of the whole force of
Spaniards in Flanders, Picharro's company and Lescano's, there
is now left in the field only about a thousand men. These
Madame is retaining in the service of M. de Gavres, who will
place them in the garrisons of the frontier towns.
London, 5 February, 1523.
P. S. The papal brief addressed to your majesty, enclosed
herewith, was given us by the cardinal. He said that it had been
sent him some days ago from Rome.
Signed, Bishop of Badajoz and Elne and Loys de Praet.
French. pp. 5.
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8 Feb.
H. H. u. St. A.
England, f. 2.
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Charles V to the Ambassadors in England.
You will see by copies of letters which the archbishop of Bari
has just written us that he is urging us to agree to a truce, and
suggests that we send powers to treat, under the mediation of the
pope, to England, so that, if Henry agrees, our joint powers may
be sent from there to Rome without delay.
The Sieur de Beaurain [Adrien de Croy], our second chamberlain,
wrote us recently that he had been in touch with some of the
people of the duke of Bourbon. Bourbon asks the hand of one
of our sisters in marriage, and offers to serve us against the king
of France with five hundred men-at-arms and ten thousand
infantry. Beaurain communicated this matter to Surrey, and
Surrey told Henry and Wolsey, who have instructed the English
ambassador here to persuade us to agree to this proposal. These
ambassadors have spoken with us fully on this subject, but we
find that there is a discrepancy between their instructions from
England and Beaurain's letters to us. Henry writes that Bourbon
will furnish 500 men-at-arms and ten thousand foot at his own
expense, but Beaurain wrote that Bourbon expects the troops to
be paid, for the most part at least, by us and by the king of
England. Also Henry appears to think that Bourbon will wait
until the time appointed for our invasion of France, but Beaurain
wrote that Bourbon only offers to furnish these troops in case
we enter France next summer. Therefore, since this whole matter
has been handled by Beaurain, and it seems safer to depend on
what he wrote to us than on what the admiral may have understood
him to say, we have told the English ambassadors that it
seems to us necessary, if we are to draw Bourbon over to our
side, to pay most of the expenses of his troops, for he is, himself,
not powerful enough to maintain so great a force. Also it will
be necessary to invade France this summer, both from the side
of England and from our side. Since the English ambassadors
have been so anxious for us to accept Bourbon's proposal, we
have asked them whether they were willing to conclude on these
terms, and if they knew whether Henry was willing to contribute
to the necessary expenses. They replied that they had no
instructions on this point, but they would inform their king at
once, and hoped that, so far as it depended on him, he would not
let us lose so great and favourable an opportunity. They asked
whether we should be ready on our side.
In order to reach a final decision on this point, we have several
times consulted with our councillors as to whether we could
raise the money necessary to put in the field an army strong
enough to invade France, lay siege to great towns and cities, and
give battle to the king of France. We find the nobles and
commons of this kingdom very willing to give us good aid for the
war. We have therefore issued writs for the assembly of our
Cortes at the beginning of next March, and since, in spite of the
favourable replies of our councillors and others, we do not wish
to conclude anything with Bourbon without being assured of the
necessary grants, and since Bourbon has not yet declared himself
in any way, we have replied to Beaurain in such a way as to
gain time, not to discourage Bourbon, and to find out how much
real confidence ought to be placed in him. We are sending you
a copy of our reply, and of our instructions to Beaurain in cipher ;
show it to Henry and Wolsey and the admiral, and then forward
it at once, by a trustworthy courier, to Beaurain. Arrange with
him to communicate with you in cipher as soon as he has
Bourbon's answer, which you will then convey at once to Henry
and Wolsey, finding out clearly what they are willing to do in
this affair, and what they advise. Notify us promptly, and
expect further instructions.
We have been waiting anxiously for a long time to hear from
you what Henry and Wolsey think ought to be done next year,
in view of the present weakness of the enemy in money and men.
We have made all the necessary preparations to meet their views,
whether they intend that we should each put an army in the
field in France next summer, or prefer a single invasion of Guienne
or Languedoc at our common expense. Since it is high time to
decide on plans for next summer, and delay now may be very
injurious, you may say to Henry and Wolsey that as soon as we
know the reply of our Cortes we shall inform them, and, as soon
as the Cortes are over, we shall be ready to invade France with a
considerable army. We have already ordered our cavalry and
infantry to be ready, and have assembled artillery, munitions
and provisions from all parts. We hope to profit by these
preparations, and hope that Henry will also make all necessary
preparations for an invasion of France this summer without,
however, putting himself to too great present expense. You may
tell Henry and Wolsey that, whatever happens this year, we are
quite determined to be entirely ready for the "Great Enterprise"
in 1524, and we hope that they will be also.
We are sending you two separate powers, so that you may be
quite prepared to conduct all our business, which we wish to
proceed according to the advice of the cardinal. By one power
you can agree to put in the field in France, on the Spanish side,
a large army, the chief expense of which we are willing to pay,
although ever since our arrival we have been continuously at war
on our frontiers, and have maintained a flying blockade of
Fuenterrabia with a considerable body of horse and foot, pressing
it so hard that all French efforts to relieve it by land or sea have
been repelled, and we hope famine will soon oblige the garrison
to surrender. Nevertheless we are willing to furnish, at our
expense, 1,700 lances, a thousand light cavalry, eight thousand
Spanish and German infantry with artillery and munitions, if
Henry will send us, by May first, five thousand English infantry,
three thousand Germans, and two thousand barrels of powder,
each of us to pay our own share of the transport of artillery and
munitions and the expenses of the pioneers. Or, if Henry prefers,
we are willing to furnish the best army we can on this side, while
he, for his part, invades France wherever he likes, by May first.
We are also sending a second power which is to be forwarded
to the duke of Sessa, our ambassador at Rome, if, and when,
Henry sends a similar power to his ambassador there, with
instructions to conclude under the mediation of the pope, a truce
for commerce and intercourse for several years. You may act
thus without further instructions from us, if Henry and Wolsey
prefer a truce to the continuance of the war, or if they feel that
while the army is being made ready there would be no harm in
trying to see whether we can arrange a favourable truce. Since
we wish to conceal nothing from the king, our brother, and do
nothing without him, we are sending you these powers. You
may say to Henry and Wolsey that we shall be satisfied with a
truce for commerce and intercourse, each side to hold whatever
it may hold on the day of its conclusion, provided that Fuenterrabia
and the strong places of the duchy of Milan are then in our hands
and those of the duke. If they are not, such places are to be
placed in the hands of the pope and neutralized during the truce,
as we wrote you by Richard. As to the duration of the truce,
we shall be satisfied with whatever term will please Henry and
Wolsey. Although our council advises us that it would be better
to make a truce on the above terms, provided the king of England
is satisfied, than to invade France with a single army, nevertheless,
if Henry and Wolsey do not wish to send similar powers to Rome,
you may tear up ours in their presence, or keep them for future
use if Henry and Wolsey prefer, for no one can tempt us to any
course without the advice of the king and the cardinal, or without
their complete satisfaction. In any event, arrange at once about
the invasion by a joint army, or by separate armies with as
great a force as possible. Do not boggle over details, for if we
fail to secure a truce we must take the favourable season for
war, and any delay will cause confusion, shame, and injury.
In order to have your reply more quickly we have ordered this
courier to stay with you. Send our packet to Flanders by another,
by whom Madame will reply. Send one of your most trustworthy
servants to Beaurain, this person to bring back Beaurain's
answer, which is to be forwarded to us by the bearer of this. If
this takes too long do not neglect to keep us informed. Moreover,
you will be very careful to keep this important matter a complete
secret, so that no person whatever, no matter how highly placed,
either in Flanders or in England, knows anything about it,
excepting, of course, the king, the cardinal, and the admiral.
When you have completed the arrangements for the armies with
Henry, however, you may communicate them secretly to Madame,
so she may know that our new plans are intended to draw the
war away from Flanders. But keep the entire Bourbon affair a
close secret, then and afterwards, and be very sure that nothing
is divulged by your servants. The ambassadors, whom, as we
wrote you, we were sending to Switzerland, encountered such
weather at sea that Raphaelo de Medici, the head of the embassy,
was drowned with others. His companion, Dr. Prantner, escaped
and returned to us, riding post. We have drawn up new instructions
and powers for him and sent him to join Dr. Steurzel, our
resident ambassador in Switzerland.
We have asked the pope to grant us the cruzada in these realms
as a necessary aid in our affairs, and have decided to send Captain
Cabanillas, or another, to beg that the grant be sent at once.
Advise Henry and Wolsey of all this news.
Valladolid, 8 February, 1523.
P.S. Since writing this, the papal nuncio called upon us in
the presence of the English ambassadors, exhorting us and them
to agree to a peace or truce for the good of Christendom, as His
Holiness had several times asked us to do. We replied that we
could not do so without the knowledge and consent of the king of
England, but that if the French were to make a reasonable offer,
His Holiness would not find us indifferent to the good of
Christendom. The English ambassadors replied for Henry that
they were without instructions on this point, but would write to
their master and conduct themselves according to his orders.
We have delayed sending these letters because, according to
captured dispatches and other information, we had hoped to
send you news of the fall of Fuenterrabia, where supplies are so
short that the garrison intended to surrender by Candlemas
unless they were relieved. Until recently the French had made
three attempts to re-provision Fuenterrabia but had always been
repulsed. Recently, however, our troops on the French side of
the river have had difficulty in securing provisions. The French
advanced against them along the road to Fuenterrabia in great
strength, and during the night the armies were so close that they
exchanged artillery fire. Our troops, fearing to be cut off by
the French advance, and thus to lose the provisions of which
they were in great need (indeed it is because of the scarcity of
provisions in this country that we have not been able to besiege
Fuenterrabia more closely), and seeing the enemy in great
strength, retired across the river without risking battle, saving
all their artillery and sustaining no damage or loss. The French,
however, were able to get a mule train loaded with provisions
into Fuenterrabia.
Copy. French. pp. 10.
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